Resilience, Political Ecology, and Power: Convergences, Divergences, and the Potential for a Postanarchist Geographical Imagination

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Abstract
Over the past three decades, resilience has emerged as an ecological concept that has transformed the way international development is conceptualized. However, it is only recently that the topic has been approached within the geography literature. In this article, I trace the linkages between resilience as an ecological concept and an emerging framework in political geography, its relationship to the field of political ecology, and the potential of a postanarchist geography in bridging the extant gap between these areas of study. To do this, I focus on the different conceptualizations of power prevalent in resilience scholarship and political ecology and offer a postanarchist conceptualization as a potential bridging point that can address the concerns of both of the fields.

Introduction
Over the past three decades, resilience has emerged as an ecological concept that has transformed the way international development is conceptualized. However, it is only recently that the topic has been approached within the geography literature. A Web of Science citation report of geography journals shows less than 50 references to the concept in 2005 and nearly 500 in 2015. The rapid growth of resilience as a model for understanding a variety of social and environmental problems has become a cause for concern for many geographers and those in allied fields, with many uneasy with the ease with which resilience is tied to neoliberal development practices (e.g., Evans and Reid 2013; Chandler 2014; Welsh 2014). This is particularly true in the interdisciplinary subfield of political ecology, where anxieties over resilience are tied to a broader concern with approaches to development and risk reduction that fail to address the causes of poverty and vulnerability (Bryant 1997; Taylor 2015; Watts 2015). Disaster scholars more broadly see promise offered by resilience, but only if inequalities are addressed in its formulation (e.g., Canon and Müller-Mahn 2010; Tierney 2014). This latter work is in line with resilience scholarship that looks to political ecology as a means of better understanding the operation of power in socioecological systems (Fabinyi, Evans, and Foale 2014; Ingalls and Stedman 2016).

In this article, I trace the linkages between resilience as an emerging framework in political geography, its relationship to the field of political ecology, and the potential of a postanarchist geography in bridging the extant gap between these areas of study. To do this, I focus on the conceptualizations of power prevalent in resilience scholarship and political ecology and offer a postanarchist approach as a potential bridging point that can address the concerns of the fields. I begin by providing a summary of the theoretical principles grounding postanarchism and the relationship between postanarchism and geography. I then outline the political geography of resilience before analyzing its relationship with the interdisciplinary field of political ecology.
Finally, I address the divergences and convergences between these bodies of research as they conceptualize power in complex socioecological systems and suggest that a postanarchist geographical imagination might bridge the extant gap between the fields and open new grounds for understanding resilience as neither an apolitical ecological concept nor a solely discursive practice that shapes and reshapes policy formations.

The Postanarchist Geographical Imagination

In recent years, geography and its related disciplines have seen a resurgence of anarchist and what could broadly be called postanarchist approaches (e.g., White and Kossoff 2007; Cudworth and Hobden 2010; Springer et al. 2012; Springer 2013a; Springer 2013b; Springer 2014; Wald 2014; Hammond 2015). As a discipline, geography's history is deeply entwined with anarchism thanks in part to the works of Élisée Reclus and Petr Kropotkin who are heralded as foundational thinkers in both circles, even if their anarchist contributions have been historically disregarded within geographic thought (MacLaughlin 1986; Springer 2012). Anarchist approaches to geography see the earth as an integrated whole that requires recognition of all of the relationships that make up that whole (Springer 2013a). These relationships are seen as naturally non-hierarchical but subject to domination and control at any point (MacLaughlin 1986; Springer 2012; 2014). The normative commitments of anarchism lie in the development of an understanding of how this domination occurs and in finding ways to overcome it, an idea that extends back to Kropotkin himself and has continued for more than a century since (1978; Springer 2014). To this end, anarchism has developed a variety of sophisticated frameworks for understanding the production and persistence of uneven power relationships that are useful for geographers. A few in particular stand out for their ability to match anarchist political theory to a particularly environmental or ecological theory of society.

Drawing on and speaking directly to Darwinian notions of evolution, Petr Kropotkin (2009) argued that strong community-based cooperation acted as a key factor in preserving life in times of crisis. Rather than competition over scare resources, he suggested that the most viable communities were those that featured the highest levels of cooperation and mutual aid (Kropotkin 2009). He would later argue for mutual aid as a desirable organizing principle for everyday life as an alternative to capitalism (Kropotkin 1913). Élisée Reclus likewise developed a complex understanding of the world that saw humanity as the consciousness of nature, suggesting that the flourishing of one is intimately entangled with flourishing of the other (Clark and Martin 2013). Thus, it is not just mutual aid among discrete communities or species that is necessary for the continuation of life but an ecological mutual aid where the survival of humanity and all nature are intimately bound, an idea that resonates with resilience scholarship. More recently, Murray Bookchin has advocated for an acutely socioecological anarchism that serves as the precondition for any ecologically viable form of society (Bookchin 1999). For Bookchin, ecology represents a particularly useful way of understanding society as spontaneous and free from authority and within which totalitarianism is an impossibility (Bookchin 1999). This is because, any attempts to centralize power, authority, or planning within an ecological system work only to undermine that system. The character of an ecological system can only be determined by those components that make up the system regardless of its scale, an inherently anarchist perspective and One that aligns well with resilience frameworks (Bookchin 1999).

While each of these various approaches to anarchism offers something to think about in terms of ecological resilience, recent poststructuralist approaches are perhaps the most useful for understanding how power operates in complex socioecological systems. Postanarchism attempts to expand on the anarchist tradition by freeing it from its modernist trappings. While Kropotkin, Reclus, and Bookchin each offer significant insight into human–environment relationships,
they understand these relationships as being an innate part of humanity corrupted by powerful outside forces. Postanarchism draws on poststructuralist analyses to suggest that there is no outside corrupting power on its own but that competing discourses are combined to create topologies of power through which life is continuously molded (May 1994; Newman 2001; Collier 2009; Springer 2013b). However, resilience’s implementation of the vocabulary of poststructuralism creates the risk of co-optation of critical responses based in poststructuralist analysis, including postanarchism (Chandler 2014). Among the earliest writings in this broad tradition is Hakim Bey’s (2003) manifesto on the Temporary Autonomous Zone, which called for a radical reorganization of daily life around ideas individual autonomy that can only be occupied temporarily before being co-opted by the spectacle of late capitalism, requiring a continuous re-evaluation and reconfiguration of social and political life (see also Sellars 2010). Saul Newman (2011) extends this argument to suggest that anarchism has its own spatial imagination that seeks an ordered and planned society but where the planning is not imposed from above but rather develops from the social relationships that exist within a given space. For Newman, like Bookchin, this ordered but emergent space constitutes what might be called a postanarchist geographical imagination. It is a space where the organization of life and resources “emerges spontaneously, and which people determine freely for themselves” along horizontal means (Newman 2011, 347). While their nascent character makes the mechanisms that operate within these spaces indeterminable in themselves, postanarchism serves as a body of critiques meant to expose those discourses which privilege particular forms of authority (Springer 2013b). When resilience discourses co-opt the language of poststructuralism, they do so in order to obscure the power relationships they produce itself (cf. Koch 1991). By tying poststructuralism to anarchism and thus challenging those linguistic deployments on the basis of their power to maintain the status quo, there exists the potential to destabilize the normative politics of resilience scholarship and expose its liberatory potential (Koch 1991; Springer 2013b). In the remainder of this article, I outline the discursive foundations of resilience’s political geography, the political ecological critique of resilience, and offer postanarchism as a possible bridge between the two.

The Political Geography of Resilience

In the time since the ecological concept of resilience developed in the early 1970s, it has become a normative model for environmental and economic policy and a key tool for governance in a complex world with an uncertain future (Aradau 2014; Welsh 2014). If humans are part of complex socioecological systems, catastrophes that disrupt human life carry the potential to cause a disruption that cannot be recovered from. Since catastrophe can occur anywhere at any time, risk reduction has been incorporated into people’s most banal practices (Aradau and Van Munster 2011). Resilience offers policymakers the opportunity to promise a new vision of security in an unknown, at risk future (Aradau 2014). The result of this understanding of resilience as part of everyday life always already at risk has resulted in new theorizing about how to build or promote resilient communities that must deal with environmental change and disasters (e.g., Aldrich 2012; Walker and Salt 2012; Washburn 2013; Rodin 2014; Tierney 2014; Biggs, Schüller, and Schoon 2015). Resilience has likewise been used to inform new approaches to sustainable development in order to address the general vulnerability experienced in less developed countries (Handmer and Dovers 1996; Folke et al. 2002; Brand 2009).

The recent upsurge of resilience as a foundational concept in multiple policy realms has drawn the attention of a number of critics who point to the discursive strategies of resilience planning to promote certain political economic goals that they see as detrimental to the continuation of life on earth (Welsh 2014). For these critics, resilience represents acquiescence to neoliberal capitalism, acceptance of a maintenance role in a system supported by mass inequality.
rather than resistance, and a need only to adapt to the vulnerability experienced in everyday life rather than attempting to eliminate it altogether (Walker and Cooper 2011; Evans and Reid 2013; Aradau 2014; Chandler 2014; Welsh 2014). Jeremy Cooper and Melinda Walker (2011) find this aspect of resilience to be a part of its origin story. They link the development of resilience in ecology with the rise in popularity of the economic work of Friedrich Hayek, arguing that a focus on the resilience of a system to absorb disturbance fits neatly within economic concepts that are similarly subject to shifts, disturbances, and potentially disastrous scenarios but, over a long enough period, maintain their desired function. David Chandler (2014) takes a slightly different approach, arguing that as the idea of resilience developed it began to incorporate and respond to a number of political economic criticisms that were being leveled against the authoritarian tendencies of both capitalism and the state. Socioecological systems thus incorporate a political economy based on the ability of the system to organize itself in complex ways. By guiding this self-organization toward systematic resilience, it can now be seen as a way of preventing the existing system from changing, thus maintaining the political economic status quo (Evans and Reid 2013).

Political Ecology and Resilience Thinking

From its inception as a discrete body of literature, political ecology has been concerned with, among other things, the ways in which apolitical ecological discourses of adaptation and maladaptation to environmental change were deployed in policy as a means of reducing vulnerability to environmental hazards (Neumann 2005; Watts 2015). Michael Watts (2015) has sought to understand whether resilience brings back the adaptation principles found in earlier ecological science as “old wine in new bottles” (38). Drawing on Pelling (2011) and Cote and Nightingale (2012), he notes how the malleability of resilience makes the principle of adaptation difficult to get a firm grasp on in this context (see also Anderson 2015). However, he does see similarity between works on resilience and the normative character of cultural ecology that political ecology sought from the outset to address (Watts 2015). Thus, while not identical, earlier appeals to adaptation and recent calls for increased resilience serve similar functions in policy discourses. For Watts (2015), an important difference arises in the way that resilience and its correlated principles function as a form of biopolitics expressed in the administration and regulation of life processes. Here, Watts agrees with a number of critics who focus on the ways resilience is used to govern and secure everyday life (Walker and Cooper 2011; Evans and Reid 2014; Grove 2014a; 2014b). Because resilience focuses on the capacity of individuals to absorb shocks without changing form or to recover from them and return to their previous state, potentially stronger, disasters and vulnerability remain inevitable characteristics of the resilience literature (see also Evans and Reid 2014). If resilience represents a way of living with rather than reducing the risk of disasters, then the normative differences that make resilience thinking incompatible with political ecology become clearer.

Matt Turner (2014) links the rise of political ecology as a field of inquiry and resilience-thinking in ecology to a mutual aversion to equilibrium approaches that could not stand up to empirical, field-based evidence (see also Holling 1973; Neumann 2005; Watts 2015). For Turner, one of the major differences between political ecology and resilience approaches is in the normative commitments of each, with resilience scholars largely missing broader systems of injustice by focusing primarily on the actions of individuals. This leaves the potential for violent, vulnerability-producing institutions to remain intact. An example of this can be seen in earlier work done by Garry Peterson (2000) who argues that resilience offers a way of including more ecological analysis in political ecology while political ecology can bring a stronger focus on political economy in work on resilience. In his case study of the political ecology of
salmon in the Columbia River Basin, however, he shows why the marriage of the two fields is difficult despite their overlap. Peterson is concerned with a variety of multi-scalar human actions that shape the ecology of the basin, potentially reducing the resilience of both human and non-human life in the area. In doing this he overlooks the political economic causes of changes in land use that decrease resilience (cf. Taylor 2015, outlined below). This is in part because the normative goals of resilience approaches, even when they attempt to make explicit the role of political economy in environmental change like Peterson's, are different than those of vulnerability and political ecology-based approaches. In the case of the Columbia River Basin, Peterson (2000) suggests changes in the form of governance of water rights so that it includes a larger number of voices combined with legal structures that prevent the wielding the political and economic power of one group over another. While such changes are certainly agreeable to a political ecology approach, they do not go far enough as they leave in place the political and economic systems that lead to a lack of resilience in the first place (cf. Turner 2014; Taylor 2015).

From a political ecology perspective, Marcus Taylor (2015) explores the role of resilience policies formulated by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank in affecting Mongolian pastoralists' experiences with climate change. By asking how to make pastoralists more resilient policymakers miss an important aspect of the question of resilience and adaptation to climate change: how is it that climate has become such an effective force in threatening herder's lives and livelihoods (Taylor 2015). To show how this has happened, he traces the history of changes in Mongolian pastoralism, in particular focusing on how the marketization of pastoral goods has created significantly different herding practices than those in the past. While herding was once a collective part of pastoral society, intervention by the Asian Development Bank and World Bank that promoted individualization effectively created a class system, where a small number of herders had flocks large enough to require the hiring of additional laborers while the majority of the population had relatively small flocks. These smaller flocks provided a less-than-steady stream of income placing many family livelihoods at the hands of those larger herders, particularly in the winter when revenue streams were lower and less regular. While many aspects of pastoral life could be handled by other means, pastoralists required a steady income in order to make payments on the loans they took out to purchase their flock. It is, according to Taylor (2015), this marketization of pastoral life and the extension of debt into Mongolian communities that make pastoralists less resilient to the impacts of climate change.

To address this, development agencies have begun projects focused on re-establishing collective forms of governance and responsibility. Like Peterson's proposed changes in the Columbia River Basin, Taylor concedes that this will likely have a positive impact on these communities but contends that it is the new, individualized and marketed political economic structure that shapes pastoralist's vulnerability. The success of previous forms of collective management was based in its integration into all aspects of life rather than as a simply secondary form of governance meant to provide security in a limited realm (Taylor 2015).

The differences between Peterson's (2000) and Taylor's (2015) reading of environmental problems, social change, and the potential for meaningful change highlight the apparent incommensurability of the approaches. This is due in part to the fact that Peterson's attempt to reconcile the fields does not account for what Antonio Ioris (2014) calls the “political ecology of the state.” Ioris argues that the “historical role and class commitments” of the state are fundamentally at odds with genuine desires for ecosystem protection (Ioris 2014, viii). This is because the state exists as a way of ordering the world for the expansion of capitalist accumulation processes at the expense of the environment even when policies are enacted that are ostensibly meant to protect the environment (Ioris 2014). The role of the state as an ordering force for the expansion and continuation of capital accumulation, even if such an approach contradicts
other proposed goals of the state, such as environmental and livelihood protections, must be accounted for. This is particularly true when such ordering has the direct effect of reducing resilience (Taylor 2015). Who is able to make environmental decisions, based on what knowledge, and to what ends are key questions asked by political ecologists in order to recognize the operation of power within socioecological systems (Bryant 1997). Such an approach is not yet matched in the resilience literature which has thus far had only limited engagement with the operations of power behind the way decisions are made (Ingalls and Stedman 2016).

**Power in Political Ecology and Resilience**

One of the key points of contention between political ecology and resilience approaches to environmental problems lie in the way each recognizes questions of power (Ingalls and Stedman 2016). Understanding how relations of power operate and the ways in which this operation impacts socioecological systems is a defining characteristic of political ecology (Bryant 1997). From its inception, political ecology has set itself apart from other approaches to social and the environmental issues through a focus on the root rather than proximate causes of these issues. Raymond Bryant (1997) has traced this through the introduction of the sustainable development paradigm and its inability to adequately address either social or environmental concerns. Because it is poverty, and not the causes of poverty (i.e., unequal relations of power in a capitalist political economy) that are tied to environmental degradation, superficial efforts at poverty alleviation that leave in place the conditioning factors that produce poverty in the first place cannot adequately speak to environmental issues (Bryant 1997; Neumann 2005; Watts 2015; see also Watts 1983; Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). Political ecology addresses this shortcoming by recognizing that “the relationship between actors […] and the links between actors and the physical environment, are conditioned by power relations” (Bryant 1997, 10). It is the inequality of actors in these power relations that must be understood if environmental problems are to be addressed effectively (Bryant 1997).

Recent scholarship in resilience has attempted to overcome resilience's lack of an analysis of power (Fabinyi, Evans, and Foale 2014; Boonstra 2016; Ingalls and Stedman 2016). Thus far, these approaches have taken political ecology's critique seriously. Michael Fabinyi and colleagues (2014) seek to understand power in resilience scholarship through an expansion of the “social” character of social–ecological systems. In particular, they focus on the ways in which differentiated social desires and relations of power are conceptualized in anthropology and political ecology, respectively. They argue that while resilience is itself inherently value neutral, it is treated primarily as a positive condition of socioecological systems with little focus on the resilience of pathological social relationships (such as poverty and general social inequality.) They argue that, while resilience approaches have attempted to account for material operations of power, they fail to account for the discursive potential for power that arose in later, explicitly poststructuralist approaches to political ecology (e.g., Tsing 2005; Li 2007; Escobar 2008). Because resilience does not account for the ability of power to circulate through particular discourses, even when it looks at the role of knowledge in producing resilient socioecological systems, it fails to understand much of the context that shapes and reshapes environmental models, assuming them to be relatively static and power neutral (Fabinyi, Evans, and Foale 2014; see also Cote and Nightingale 2012).

Wiebren Boonstra (2016) has noted that other social scientists, including political ecologists, have reasons for understanding power that move beyond clarification and better measurement of an ecosystems potential for resilience, including understanding “the extent to which systems and institutions help people in societies to meet their needs and wants, free from the power of others” (Boonstra 2016, 2). However, this is often antithetical to the ways in which resilience is
enacted in policy. David Chandler (2014) has argued that the approach taken in resilience scholarship to understand the relationship between actors forecloses on the possibility of problems being assigned to any particular cause due to vulnerability's nonpoint origin, a fact conceded to some degree by Boonstra (2016). However, while direct causal relationships cannot be traced due to the epistemology on which resilience is founded, there is a need to recognize the indirect responsibility for actions that cause negative socioecological impacts (Chandler 2014; Boonstra 2016). To assign some level of responsibility, Boonstra (2016) argues for a focus on power that looks not for particular individuals but instead at the ability of individuals and groups to shape social relationships in ways that cause resilience to be reduced. This analysis of power thus does not require individuals be blamed or held liable but does recognize that the actions of individuals are not equally powerful in a socioecological system. While a useful addition to the resilience literature, this conceptualization of power offers little in the way of a possibility for resistance or structural change to take place that does not require the benevolence of those who wield power in a particular set of social relationships. It likewise leaves in place the potential for the conditions that produced vulnerability and reduced resilience to persist in the first place, thus failing to overcome political ecology's initial critique.

**Postanarchism, Power, and the State in Resilience and Political Ecology**

Present approaches to incorporating an analysis of power into resilience scholarship focus primarily on what lacks in the literature and the potential of political ecology and other social science–based approaches to be better incorporated into existing frameworks (e.g., Fabinyi, Evans, and Foale 2014; Boonstra 2016; Ingalls and Stedman 2016). Where integration is attempted, it is incomplete or fails to address all of the issues arising between the different approaches. Fabinyi, Evans, and Foale (2014) relate this to epistemological differences between resilience approaches, which have their roots in a positivist natural science, and social science approaches which are generally skeptical of methods that seek to understand a nature that exists outside of human interpretations and explanations of it, interpretations and explanations that are often themselves seen as power-laden. Despite these shortcomings, there is a general recognition that, at least as a socioecological concept, resilience approaches do not adequately conceptualize power relations and that political ecology might serve as a remedy to this. I conclude this paper by suggesting that the gap between resilience and political ecology can be overcome not by attempts to incorporate the existing analysis of one field into the other but through a specific engagement with a postanarchist approach that merges insights from both fields of study.

Postanarchism draws its analysis of power from poststructuralist scholarship stemming primarily from the work of French philosophers Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari which it combines with an anarchist ethic of non-domination (see May 1994; Newman 2001; 2010). To demonstrate how this might be used to add an analysis of power into resilience approaches and move the ecology of resilience more readily into political ecology, I focus on a postanarchist understanding of the power of the state. The state serves as a particularly salient example in this case because state power is a key concern for both scholars interested in ecological resilience and political ecologists (e.g., Holling and Meffe 1996; Ioris 2014). In resilience scholarship, the centralized, top-down, and planned nature of the state’s attempts to manage natural resources is an important reason for decreases in the resilience of complex socioecological systems (Holling and Meffe 1996). While the state might be used to ensure a level playing field, resource users themselves who are able to react and adapt quickly are best suited to manage resources (Walker and Salt 2012). For political ecologists, the state’s intervention into the environment primarily serves the expansion of capitalist accumulation and, as demonstrated above, such an expansion can actively work to increase environmental vulnerability.
and decrease resilience (Ioris 2014; Taylor 2015). Political ecologists recognize the role of capital in manipulating state power for the continued growth of capital while resilience scholars tend to envision the state as a structure with a logic of its own, working to protect its own interests at the expense of sustainability and regardless of its relationship to the economy. Going back to the nineteenth century, anarchists have seen both of these views as partially correct (Newman 2010). The state has a class character, acting as a tool for the perpetuation of capitalism as well as a structure that exists besides its present form where it acts as a locus of power in itself that seeks to protect its own interests (Newman 2010). Neither understanding on its own, however correct, adequately explains the way the state functions as a means for ordering socioecological systems.

According to David Chandler (2014), it was the resurgence of an anti-statist ethic in the post-1968 left that, in part, gave rise to resilience thinking as a paradigm for the governance of complex life. The systematic breakdown of trust in the state gave birth to a new form of politics which saw all authoritarian structures, both through the state and through the demands of taking part in a capitalist economy, as stifling the creative potential of life (see Feenberg 2001). Through the logic of resilience, the state works to institutionalize and authorize particular scientific discourses about the environment while simultaneously utilizing those and competing discourses to institutionalize the authority of a capitalist logic. In the process, however, it obscures its own organization of power by co-opting the very language meant to undercut its foundation (Koch 1991; see also Chandler 2014). Through an analysis and critique not only of this authority but also the discourses it authorizes, postanarchism opens resilience to resistance and reformulation along lines that place neither vulnerable subjects nor unidentifiable powerful systems such as the state as the sole causal agents for vulnerability, but instead recognizing the dialectical relationship between capital, power, and nature to protect capitalism at the expense of life itself (cf. Springer 2013b; Moore 2015). This is done through what Saul Newman (2001) calls a politics of postanarchism that draws on an ethical politics of resistance to domination. How domination is defined remains open. We can see domination in the ways that the state tries to organize life in ways that produce socioecological vulnerability and a lack of resilience while likewise seeing domination as the organization of capital in ways that require the world's poor to live precarious lives in the name of increased resilience. The open-ended nature of this approach similarly allows us to draw from a variety of tools to understand the operation of power that prevents us from seeing liberated, resilient lives.

**Conclusion: Resilience Otherwise**

What happens to a thing like resilience when it is married to a postanarchist conceptualization of power? What happens, for example, if we were to say that capitalism itself, as a diffuse system that produces power through specific discursive truths about the necessity of the market is what causes vulnerability and thus reduces resilience? How can we imagine a critique of resilience that does not rely on hierarchy? Anarchist thinking allows for a reconsideration of what it means to be resilient by shifting the discourse of survival from maintaining the status quo to the necessity of socioecological solidarity based on principles of mutual aid and non-domination (Bookchin 1999; Clark and Martin 2013). Poststructuralist understandings of power as negotiated and formed rather than held in place allow us to overcome the humanist trappings of earlier anarchist thinking that saw solidarity as an essential – rather than an emergent and contested – characteristic (Newman 2001). If it is true that the neoliberal state seeks to undermine all forms of emergent social solidarity in the name of continued capital accumulation, as David Harvey (2006) suggests, then neoliberalism also directly undermines the socioecological bonds that make people resilient in a postanarchist understanding of the term, at least as much as top down
approaches to environmental management (cf. Holling and Meffe 1996). Resilience is mobilized in policy informed by socioecological scholarship in ways that seek to define it as a means of continuing life under capitalism. However, capitalism has played a key role in creating the present environmental crisis that resilience thinking is mobilized in response to (Haraway 2015). By continuing life under a political economic system that produces an existential threat, this discursive mobilization of resilience does little more than maintain dangerous political economic and socioecological hierarchies. A postanarchist conceptualization of power, political ecology’s focus on the political economy within which this power operates, and resilience thinking’s understanding of interconnected ecological lives combine to form not only a powerful tool for understanding the world, but also for changing it.

Short Biography

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Note

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